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Abstract.
The concept of demographic engineering has been of great importance to the understanding of state
violence towards ethnic minority groups. The application of this concept to understand the
similarities and differences of repressive policies towards ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union and
(Ottoman) Turkey, however, is so far lacking in the debate. This article tackles this issue by
investigating the similarities and differences of the origin, formation, and implementation of state
violence towards ethnic minority groups in the form of mass internal resettlement programs
launched by these two regimes in the first half of the twentieth century. This comparative survey
shows that, in pursuit of very different ideological ends, both states exhibited a large degree of
similarities in the political techniques they used to pursue forced internal population settlements in
practice. These practical similarities have serious implications for our understanding of the possible
causes and nature of demographic engineering.
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The Gardening States: Comparing State Repression of Ethnic Minorities in the 
Soviet Union and Turkey, 1908-1945
Duco Heijs
Utrecht University
Utrecht, The Netherlands
He said it was important to get to know the East/
Said the people are a garden and we are gardeners/
Trees are not rejuvenated by grafting only/
First it is necessary to trim the tree
-Poem by Ziya Gökalp, in The Red Apple, 19141
Our Children blossom on the living trunk of our life; they are not a bouquet, they are a 
wonderful apple orchard. And this orchard is ours… Be so kind as to take on this job: dig, 
water, get rid of caterpillars, prune out the dead branches. Remember the words of the great 
gardener, Stalin.
-Anton Makarenko, A Book for Parents, 19372
Introduction
Gökalp and Makarenko were agents of a “gardening” mentality that held sway in (Ottoman) Turkey 
and the Soviet Union in the first half of the twentieth century. In these countries, the social and 
ethnic realms of the state were reconceptualized as entities that required continuous cultivation 
in pursuit of a utopian vision of the future. This was manifested in state-sponsored interventionist 
programs favoring particular population groups, whilst other groups came to be regarded as 
unwanted, undesirable, or in another way unfit to be a part of the new order. Such unfit groups, 
or the “weeds” of society, were in many instances ethnic minority groups. As a result, in roughly 
the same time period, the Turkish and Soviet states deported, resettled, and in some instances even 
massacred, entire categories of their own populations on the basis of their perceived ethnic identity.
Examples of instances of state violence toward ethnic minorities in the first half of the twentieth 
century are abundant. In the Ottoman Empire/Turkey: the Armenian Genocide; ethnic cleansing of 
Greeks and Armenians during the War of Liberation; a population transfer with Greece in 1923; and 
deportations of Kurds from Eastern to Western Anatolia from the 1920s until the 1940s. In Tsarist 
Russia/the Soviet Union, examples include massive deportation campaigns during the First World 
War; decossackization campaigns during the Civil War; the deportation of Germans and Poles to 
spetsposelenie (special settlements) in 1935-1936; the various national operations of the Great Terror; 
and the deportation of a whole range of nationalities during and after the Second World War.3 
 This article compares such state repression of ethnic minority groups in the Soviet Union and 
(Ottoman) Turkey as instances of demographic engineering, which is in turn seen as an aspect of 
state-led modernization and group-based population policy. The article argues that, in pursuit of 
very different politico-ideological ends, these states exhibited a large degree of similarities in the 
ways they portrayed ethnic diversity in relation to the build-up of a new political order, as well as 
in the political techniques they used to repress ethnic minority groups in practice.
Comparing State Repression of Ethnic Minority Groups: Population Policy and Demographic 
Engineering
In recent historiography on the Soviet Union and (Ottoman) Turkey, scholars have applied the 
concepts of population policy and demographic engineering (as an aspect of state-led political 
modernization) as explanatory factors for the mass violence that was deployed towards specific 
1 Uğur Ümit Üngör, The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913-1950 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 35.
2 David Hoffman, Cultivating the Masses: Modern State Practices and Soviet Socialism, 1914-1939 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2011), 1.
3 It should be noted that whereas state violence in Turkey was aimed primarily at non-Turkish citizens, in the 
Soviet Union it was by all means not exclusively aimed at ethnic minority groups. Underlying the comparison 
of this article is the notion that the repression of ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union was a distinctive category 
of repression worthy of separate analysis.
Heijs
©2018     Genocide Studies and Prevention 12, no. 1  https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.12.1.1579
64
categories of people identified by the state.4 The term population policy (often used interchangeably 
with demographic engineering), refers in the broadest sense to these actions, techniques, or 
programs adopted by the state that have the purpose of influencing demographic processes.5 The 
methods by which states may attempt to achieve this include pronatalist policies, forced population 
movements, assimilation, and boundary alterations.6 Scholars implicitly or explicitly distinguish 
between practices of hard engineering (forced population movements or the physical destruction 
of population groups) and soft engineering (more subtle and indirect policies, such as incentives to 
migrate or birth rate limitations).7
From a historical perspective, the emergence of population policy refers to a process 
originating in western Europe, in which the population was reconceptualized as a social entity to be 
rationally studied and managed by the state, stimulating a new ethos of social state intervention.8 
In nineteenth century Europe, this process became connected to a growing scientific discourse on 
eugenics. Advocates of eugenics argued that scientists could have a central role in improving the 
biological condition of human beings through cultivating elements considered desirable, whilst 
exterminating those considered unsuitable.9 
In his monumental study on modernity and the Holocaust, Zygmunt Bauman refers to the 
process of state intervention with the aim of creating a perfect society as social engineering or 
gardening.10 It was this vision of society as an object of administration, and a collection of problems 
to be solved with the institutions of the modern state, that could, according to Bauman, make 
“Holocaust-style solutions not only possible, but eminently ‘reasonable.’”11 Moreover, in several 
instances of genocide, the imagination of a homogeneous society in ethnic, racial, cultural, or 
political terms played a major role. This proved to be a particularly deadly combination when it 
came to be connected to mass-based revolutionary movements that saw the state as the critical 
agent of societal transformation.12 
Despite the strong comparative outlook entailed in the concept of population policy and its 
successful application in the historiographies of both Turkey and the Soviet Union, the similarities 
4 For the Soviet Union, see, among others Peter Holquist, “State Violence as Technique: The Logic of Violence 
in Soviet Totalitarianism,” in Stalinism: The Essential Readings, ed. David L. Hoffmann (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, Ltd., 2003), 129-156; David Hoffmann and Yanni Kotsonis, eds., Russian Modernity: Politics, 
Knowledge, Practices (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000); Hoffmann, Cultivating the Masses; Stephen Kotkin, 
“Modern Times: The Soviet Union and the Interwar Conjuncture,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian 
History 2, no. 1 (2008), 111-164; Amir Weiner, “Nature, Nurture, and Memory in a Socialist Utopia: Delineating 
the Soviet Socio-Ethnic Body in the Age of Socialism,” The American Historical Review 104, no. 4 (1999), 1114-
1155; Amir Weiner, “Introduction: Landscaping the Human Garden,” in Landscaping the Human Garden: 
Twentieth-Century Population Management in a Comparative Framework (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2003); Uğur Ümit Üngör, “Seeing like a Nation-State: Young Turk Social Engineering in Eastern Turkey, 1913-
50,” Journal of Genocide Research 10, no. 1 (2008), 15-39; Üngör, The Making of Modern Turkey; Taner Akçam, 
The Young Turks’ Crime Against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Nesim Şeker, “Demographic Engineering in the Late Ottoman 
Empire and the Armenians,” Middle Eastern Studies 43, no. 3 (May 1, 2007), 461-474.
5 Paul Demeny, “Population Policy: The Role of National Governments,” Population and Development Review 1, no. 1 
(1975), 147.
6 Milica Zarkovic Bookman, The Demographic Struggle for Power: The Political Economy of Demographic Engineering in 
the Modern World (London: Routledge, 2013), 3.
7 Morland, Demographic Engineering, chap. 2.
8 Holquist, State Violence as Technique, 111-112; See also Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in The Foucault Effect: 
Studies in Governmentality, ed. Graham Burchell, et al (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 87-104. 
9 Maria Sophia Quine, Population Politics in Twentieth-Century Europe: Fascist Dictatorships and Liberal Democracies 
(New York: Routledge, 1996), 1-15; For eugenic discourse in the Soviet Union and Turkey, see Nikolai 
Krementsov, “From ‘Beastly Philosophy’ to Medical Genetics: Eugenics in Russia and the Soviet Union,” 
Annals of Science 68, no. 1 (2011), 61-92; Ayça Alemdaroğlu, “Politics of the Body and Eugenic Discourse in 
Early Republican Turkey,” Body & Society 11, no. 3 (2005), 61-76.
10 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
11 Ibid., 18.
12 Eric D. Weitz, “Utopian Ideologies as Motives for Genocide,” in Encyclopedia for Genocide and Crimes Against 
Humanity, ed. Dinah L. Shelton, World History in Context (Detroit: Thomson/Gale, 2005), 1124-1127.
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and differences of the mechanisms of state violence and repression of ethnic minorities in the Soviet 
Union and Republican Turkey is an under-researched theme. Studies that place the Soviet Union in 
a comparative context, for example, limit the comparison to Western Europe, or more traditionally 
compare it under the denominator of totalitarianism with Nazi Germany.13 A number of case 
studies of separate instances of ethnic cleansing and genocidal violence that include both Turkish 
and Soviet cases do exist, but they do not take into account the larger structure of the regime, the 
variation of cases among different ethnic groups, the development of policy over a longer period, 
or the concept of population policy.14 Part of this disposition derives from a persistent tendency to 
stress the exceptionality of a particular instance of state violence, such as the Great Terror in the 
Soviet Union, or the Armenian Genocide in Ottoman Turkey.15 
In the few studies that do explicitly compare the political regimes of the Soviet Union and Turkey, 
the latter often comes off with a cleaner image. For example, Shmuel Eisenstadt, in comparing the 
Kemalist revolution with among others the Russian ones, concludes that the institutionalization of 
coercion was limited in Turkey.16 Stefan Plaggenborg, similarly, comparing the levels of violence in 
Soviet Communism, Italian Fascism, and Kemalism in Turkey, argued that the latter was the least 
violent of the three because, quite simply, the Kemalists killed fewer people and had a “sensibility 
for law and justice.”17 There are a number of issues with such an interpretation. First, Turkey simply 
had a much smaller population (162 vs. 16 million in 1935/1937), meaning that statements about 
the lower number of victims need to be qualified. Second, the fact that the number of victims was 
comparatively lower in Turkey should not lead us to ignore its manifold violent aspects. Third, 
the history of the repression of Kurdish rebellions and deportations of Kurds remains somewhat 
neglected, and the historiography on it is comparatively much less developed than historiography 
on ethnic repression in the Soviet Union. 
The remaining pages of this article attempt to formulate a way to confront this historiographic 
gap by discussing the similarities and differences of three interrelated aspects of state repression 
of ethnic minority groups in Turkey and the Soviet Union. First, it looks at the way practices of 
state repression and forced population settlements emerged and were institutionalized by the state 
in the context of regime change during and after the First World War. Then, it goes on to discuss 
the political strategies for dealing with ethnic diversity that were formulated by political leaders 
in the new regimes in the first decades after their establishment, demonstrating how alternating 
tendencies of inclusion and exclusion were present in these policies. The final part of the article 
compares deportations and massacres that were deployed towards the Chechen-Ingush in the 
Soviet Union, and towards the Zaza Kurds in Republican Turkey. The conclusion will discuss the 
implications of the similarities and differences between these two cases for our understanding of 
demographic engineering as a method of statecraft. 
Regime Change
The Republic of Turkey and the Soviet Union shared several similar historical legacies and 
displayed a number of common characteristics in the first decades of their formation and existence. 
13 Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick, eds., Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009).
14 Examples are Eric D. Weitz, A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2015), which includes a short section on the Armenian genocide, and a chapter on Bolshevik violence; 
Naimark, Fires of Hatred, which includes case studies on ethnic cleansing of Armenians and Greeks in Anatolia 
and the Chechen-Ingush in the Soviet Union; and Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic 
Cleansing (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), which offers extensive typologies of ethnic cleansing, 
discussing a plethora of case studies including the Armenian genocide and Communist ethnic cleansing in the 
Soviet Union, China, and Cambodia.
15 Uğur Ümit Üngör, “State Violence under Kemalism and Stalinism: Common Themes and Analogies” 
(unpublished article, 2017), 9-10.
16 Shmuel Eisenstadt, “The Kemalist Revolution in Comparative Perspective,” in Atatürk, Founder of a Modern State, 
ed. Ergun Özbudun and Ali Kazancigil (London: C. Hurst, 1981), 127-140. 
17 Stefan Plaggenborg, Ordnung Und Gewalt: Kemalismus - Faschismus - Sozialismus (München: Oldenbourg, 2012), 
258.
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Both states emerged on the geopolitical landscape of Europe out of the collapse of the imperial 
order on the continent during the First World War and its immediate aftermath. In both states, the 
violent epoch of the First World War was extended and spilled into new conflicts. In the Soviet 
Union, the First World War was followed by the Civil War that ended in 1922 with the official 
establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). In the Ottoman Empire, the First 
World War was preceded by the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and followed by the War of Liberation 
of 1919-1923, ending with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. The ruling parties of these 
successor states (respectively the Committee of Union and Progress or CUP, and its successor the 
Republican People’s Party or RPP in the Ottoman Empire/Turkey, and the Communist/Bolshevik 
Party in Tsarist Russia/The Soviet Union) seized and consolidated power in this period of conflict. 
This had a profound impact on the ruling style of these parties, in which war and politics came 
to be entwined.18 After they consolidated their power, these parties embarked upon an ambitious 
agenda of state-led modernization, promising definitive and radical solutions to the problems that 
had haunted the late imperial era. Doing so, they both preached social and cultural revolution that 
was to unfold under their single-party leadership. To this end, they pursued mass mobilization, 
political centralization, and nation building.19
Of course, there were important differences in the process of regime change as well. Most 
notably, the CUP came to power in the context of severe territorial loss, as a movement that wanted 
to radically reform, but ultimately preserve the state. What bonded them was not so much a coherent 
and clear-cult ideological program or doctrine that purported to fundamentally transform society 
or overthrow the old order, but rather their distinctive approach to uplifting their country from its 
current predicament. This approach was aimed at establishing an ethnically homogeneous Turkish 
fatherland (vatan). There were moreover strong continuities between the Kemalists of the RPP and 
the Young Turks of the CUP, despite the strong anti-imperial sentiment that held sway by the 
time the Republic of Turkey was established. The experiences of the Republic’s new president, 
Mustafa Kemal, had been shaped as an activist in the Young Turk movement, and many of the 
social engineers that worked for the Young Turks before and during the War continued to do so 
for Kemal’s Republican Party.20 The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, had come to power as a radical 
political party that did not want to reform the tsarist state, but abolish it and replace it entirely. 
They stood in the tradition of a radical revolutionary movement dating back to the nineteenth 
century that had lamented what they perceived as Russia’s backwardness, and preached the need 
for it to catch up with the West through far-reaching social renovation and refashioning of the 
empire. Unlike the Young Turks and the Kemalists, the Bolsheviks did not want to establish a 
nation state, but preached class struggle and the imminent coming of socialist paradise on earth 
under the leadership of a strong, united vanguard party.21
As a result of these differences, the institutional continuities were far greater in the Ottoman 
Empire/Turkey than in Tsarist Russia/the Soviet Union. In Republican Turkey, there was only limited 
upheaval in the realm of political institutions, the civic bureaucracy, and the military. Bureaucratic 
purges and show trials were organized, but fairly limited in scope. The most significant innovation 
of the Kemalists was the prominence of the Republican People’s Party (RPP). The RPP was 
increasingly used as an instrument of mass mobilization, although the implementation of politics 
was left to the regular state apparatus.22 In the Soviet Union, the Bolsheviks embarked directly 
18 Üngör, State Violence under Kemalism and Stalinism, 5.
19 Ibid; Adeeb Khalid, “Backwardness and the Quest for Civilization: Early Soviet Central Asia in Comparative 
Perspective,” Slavic Review 65, no. 2 (2006), 231-251.
20 Erik Jan Zürcher and Touraj Atabaki, “Introduction,” in Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernisation in Turkey and Iran, 
1918-1942 (London: I.B.Tauris, 2004), 1-12; Ryan Gingeras, Fall of the Sultanate: The Great War and the End of the Ottoman 
Empire, 1908-1922 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 1-7; M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 48; Üngör, The Making of Modern Turkey, 121.
21 Hoffmann, Cultivating the Masses, 1-16; Yinghong Cheng, Creating the “New Man”: From Enlightenment Ideals to 
Socialist Realities (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009), 15-20.
22 Erik Jan Zürcher, “Institution Building in the Kemalist Republic: The Role of the People’s Party,” in Men of Order: 
Authoritarian Modernisation in Turkey and Iran, 1918-1942, ed. Erik Jan Zürcher and Touraj Atabaki (London: 
I.B.Tauris, 2004), 98-112.
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after the revolution upon a process of immense party-based institutionalization and an almost 
complete restructuring of the relationship between state and society. This leadership strategy had 
an enormous impact on the shape and structure of the state and its bureaucracy, in which state 
and party increasingly overlapped.23 This immense institutional upheaval also led to large-scale 
repression of the newly established institutions themselves, and bureaucratic purges and show 
trials run throughout the history of the Bolshevik party.24 
Whatever their differences, the processes by which the successor states were established and 
regime change was accomplished involved large-scale population policies and repression of ethnic 
minorities. In Russia, the practice of violently excising certain populations considered dangerous 
or harmful bridged the revolutionary divide and was practiced by both the Tsarist and Soviet 
regimes (and, for that matter, by the Provisional Government in 1917 as well).25 Early twentieth 
century Russian political leaders were convinced they had a civilizing mission, in which order 
would be brought to the culturally backward non-Russians.26 An important part of this process 
was the classification of the population into a simple hierarchy of nationalities that was ranked 
according to degrees of reliability.27 In the context of total mobilization for the First World War, 
military authorities argued that certain historically sensitive border regions had to be cleansed 
from populations they considered unreliable.28 During the war, the Russian government deported 
up to one million non-Russian subjects, mostly Jews and Germans, in one of the largest practices of 
forced migration up to the Second World War.29 During the Civil War that followed the revolution, 
all warring parties practiced the deportation of certain distrusted elements of the population. In 
the words of one Soviet official speaking about the policy of decossackization, the objective of 
establishing Soviet power was unthinkable “until we slaughter all [the Cossacks] and resettle the 
Don with an external element.”30 
 In the Ottoman Empire, the First World War also provided the context for large-scale 
population policies. During the war, in 1915, Ottoman authorities decided to deport the entire 
Armenian population, which it had come to regard as a dangerous fifth column, from the war 
zone in the East to the Syrian Desert. The campaigns went far beyond deportations as thousands 
of Armenians were massacred outright. Recent estimates based upon extensive archival research 
indicate that the number of deportees lay between 850,000 and 1,200,000, of who about 600,000 had 
perished by 1916.31 The governor of Diyarbekir province argued that the “Armenian question” was 
a problem of choosing “between killing the disease and the patients or seeing the destruction of the 
23 Yoram Gorlizki and Hans Mommsen, “The Political (Dis)Orders of Stalinism and National Socialism,” in Beyond 
Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared, ed. Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 41-86.
24 For a history of party purges, see J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-
Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932-39, Annals of Communism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); Sheila 
Fitzpatrick, “How the Mice Buried the Cat: Scenes from the Great Purges of 1937 in the Russian Provinces,” The 
Russian Review 52, no. 3 (1993), 299-320. 
25 Peter Holquist, “To Count, to Extract, and to Exterminate: Population Statistics and Population Politics in Late 
Imperial and Soviet Russia,” in A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, ed. 
Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 111-144.
26 Mark Steinberg, “Russia’s Fin Die Siècle, 1900-1914,” in The Cambridge History of Russia. Vol. 3, The Twentieth 
Century, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 89-93.
27 Eric Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The Campaign against Enemy Aliens during World War I (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 84,121-122,157, 164-165. 
28 Holquist, To Count, to Extract, and to Exterminate, 124.
29 Eric Lohr, “The Russian Army and the Jews: Mass Deportation, Hostages, and Violence during World War I,” 
The Russian Review 60, no. 3 (2001), 404.
30 Holquist, To Count, to Extract, and to Exterminate, 129.
31 For a historiographic discussion of estimates of the death toll of the Armenian Genocide, see Ronald Grigor 
Suny, “They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else: A History of the Armenian Genocide (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2015), 354-355; Akçam, The Young Turks’ Crime Against Humanity, 258, gives a number of 
1,200,000 casualties.
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Turkish nation at the hands of madmen.”32 Deportation practices during the war were not limited 
to the Armenian population, as Yezidis, Syriacs, and Kurds were also deported.33 Moreover, several 
segments of the Greek population were deported from the Aegean littoral to the hinterland of Asia 
Minor. Eşref Sencer Kuşçubaşı, one of the leaders of the Special Organization, the organization 
that was responsible for the implementation of the deportations, described Ottoman Greeks as 
internal tumors that had to be removed.34 Population policies aimed towards ethnic minorities 
were also practiced by the later Kemalist state. Already in 1907, Atatürk proposed “the Ottoman 
Empire should voluntarily dissolve itself in order to pave the way for population exchanges that 
would give rise to a Turkish nation state.”35 To this end, a population exchange with Greece was 
organized, in which the remainder of the Greek Orthodox population (about 900,000 people) was 
exchanged against Muslims from Greece (about 400,000).36
Governing Ethnicity, Conquering Backwardness
These violent practices stood in stark contrast with a much-used discourse that promised the 
possibility that irrespective of ethnic identity; various population groups inhabiting the territory 
of the state could join the new political order. This chasm had much to do with the double-edged 
nature of the notion of backwardness that was used in both states. On the one hand, it were 
the states as a whole that were to catch up with the West under the auspices of a political elite 
that was presented as civilized and omnipotent. On the other hand, backwardness was used to 
refer to particular regions that were considered notoriously uncivilized and an impediment to 
development in general. In any case, backwardness was a discursive vehicle for implementing 
radically transformative policies. The possibility of overcoming regional backwardness was 
proclaimed in both states, and was predicated upon the espousal of nurturist and non-essentialist 
conceptions of nationality of political leaders.
In Turkey, the Kemalists believed that non-Turkish population groups, most importantly the 
Kurds, could become Turkified through a process of (forced) assimilation. The Soviet regime also 
made painstaking efforts to prove that irrespective of ethnic background, every population group 
could participate in socialist construction. This shared ideal partly derived from nurturist and non-
essentialist conceptions of nationality and ethnicity that held sway in both regimes. Political leaders 
of the new regimes rejected biological racism and the idea that ethnic and national identities were 
fixed in time. According to Stalin, the nation was a political form characteristic of the capitalist 
period, defined as a “historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, 
and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture.”37 Moreover, Stalin argued, 
although nations may have certain particularities or distinguishing characteristics, these are not 
fixed or unchangeable, but are subject to changing socio-historical circumstances.38 Ziya Gökalp, 
an important ideologue of the Young Turk and Kemalist regimes, had similar convictions. Gökalp 
argued, “race is a term properly used only in zoology.”39 Moreover, he argued that “social traits are 
not transmitted through biologic inheritance but only through education, which means that ethnic 
origin plays no role whatever as regards national character.”40 
Yet, despite such nurturist proclamations, a trend towards exclusiveness on ethnic grounds 
can be discerned in both states. In the Soviet Union of the 1930s, non-Russian ethnicity had become 
32 Erik Jan Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 346, fn 20.
33 Üngör, The Making of Modern Turkey, 101.
34 Zürcher, Turkey, 346, fn. 20.
35 Hanioğlu, Atatürk, 37.
36 Zürcher, Turkey, 164; For the population exchanges see Renee Hirschon, Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 
1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003). 
37 Joseph Stalin, “Marxism and the National Question (1913),” in Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, a 
Collection of Articles and Speeches, trans. A. Fineberg (Moscow: Partizdat, 1934), 8.
38 Stalin, Marxism and the National Question, 8.
39 Ziya Gökalp, The Principles of Turkism: Translated from the Turkish and Annotated by Robert Devereux, trans. Robert 
Devereaux (The Netherlands: Leiden E.J. Brill, 1968), 12.
40 Ibid, 13.
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a marker of unreliability, and enemies of the state were increasingly defined in ethnic terms.41 
This process reached its climax in the context of the Second World War with the construction of a 
whole range of enemy nations that were perceived as inherently subversive of Soviet rule. Leaders 
in the Republic of Turkey oscillated on a similar scale. Whereas in 1921 Atatürk had proclaimed 
the possibility of granting Kurdish groups local autonomy, only four years later he discarded any 
possibility of giving minority groups equal rights.42 Moreover, after several Kurdish rebellions, 
a picture of the Kurds was generated as being Mountain Turks that were culturally backward, 
incapable of giving up their tribal identity, and forming an internal threat to the territorial integrity 
of Turkey.43 
This chasm between a nurturist discourse and an increasingly violent and exclusive political 
practice had much to do with a tension between, on the one hand, the strategic necessity of 
incorporating certain ethnic minority groups into the new order, and on the other hand, experiences 
of resistance to the new regimes from certain ethnic groups. As Stalin himself remarked, almost 
half of the Soviet population consisted of non-Russians, and they mostly inhabited border regions 
that “abound in raw materials, fuel and foodstuffs”, but were “less developed than Central Russia” 
and politically and military vulnerable.44 Simultaneously, Stalin warned of the danger of “petty 
bourgeois elements” that could infiltrate the party, a danger that was particularly immediate in 
border regions.45 In Turkey, the Kurds accounted for almost twenty percent of the population and 
inhabited a large contiguous area in the southeast. Hence, their adherence to the new regime was 
deemed crucial for the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the state. Kurdish resistance to 
assimilationist policies of the Kemalist state were seen through the lens of regional backwardness, 
and Kurds were seen as “the evils of Turkey’s pre-modern past.”46 The fears of both regimes were 
of course not entirely fabricated. In the Soviet Union, peasant resistance to the programs of forced 
collectivization was substantially more widespread in the border regions.47 In Turkey, of the 
eighteen rebellions that broke out on Turkish territory in the period of 1924-1938, Kurdish groups 
organized sixteen of them.48 
In order to overcome such resistance and perceived backwardness, both states launched 
ambitious modernization programs that were aimed at forging a new identity among certain elements 
of the population that were considered problematic. During the 1920s and the 1930s, the Bolsheviks 
launched extensive campaigns of so-called indigenization or nativization (korenizatsiia).49 These 
campaigns stimulated the development of national institutions, national languages, and national 
elites. Hence, although the Soviet Union was a unified state that institutionalized nationality, it did 
41 Mark Levene, Crisis of Genocide: The European Rimlands 1912-1938 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 348; 
Weiner, Nature, Nurture, and Memory; Eric D. Weitz, “Racial Politics without the Concept of Race: Reevaluating 
Soviet Ethnic and National Purges,” Slavic Review 61, no. 1 (2002), 1-29; Francine Hirsch, “Race Without the 
Practice of Racial Politics,” Slavic Review 61, no. 1 (2002), 30-43.
42 Mesut Yegen, “‘Prospective-Turks’ or ‘Pseudo-Citizens’: Kurds in Turkey,” The Middle East Journal 63, no. 4 
(2009), 599.
43 Welat Zeydanlıoğlu, “‘The White Turkish Man’s Burden’: Orientalism, Kemalism and the Kurds in Turkey,” 
in Neo-Colonial Mentalities in Contemporary Europe? Language and Discourse in the Construction of Identities, ed. 
Guido Rings and Anne Ife (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008), 8.
44 Joseph Stalin, “The October Revolution and the National Policy of the Russian Communists (1921),” in Marxism 
and the National and Colonial Question, a Collection of Articles and Speeches, trans. A. Fineberg (Moscow: Partizdat, 
1934), 117.
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to the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P., Endorsed by the Central Comittee,” in Marxism and the National and Colonial 
Question, a Collection of Articles and Speeches, trans. A. Fineberg (Moscow: Partizdat, 1934), 88-98.
46 Yegen, Prospective-Turks or Pseudo-Citizens, 599. 
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not strive to create an overarching national identity. There was no single official language, and no 
single national culture, even during the return to an increasing Russian nationalist discourse in 
the 1930s.50 Scholars of Soviet nationality policy agree that, in principle, it was aimed at depriving 
nationality of its content by granting the forms of nationhood with the goal of delivering the 
message of the revolution in the Soviet Union’s various languages.51 Thus, nationality policy was 
as much a way of granting non-Russian populations a degree of autonomy, as it was a means of 
achieving central control over the country’s periphery. This is what Stalin meant to achieve with 
his famous formula of “national in form, socialist in content.”
In Turkey, a comprehensive approach to assimilate the Kurdish population was formulated in 
the so-called Şark Islahat Planı (Eastern Regions Reform Plan).52 Moreover, several Inspectorate-
Generals were established as regional governments in areas that had witnessed some form of 
Kurdish resistance. The Inspectorate-Generals were meant to incorporate these regions in the 
Turkish nation through implementing policies realizing Turkification.53 In order to achieve the 
strengthening of national consciousness among the Anatolian population in general, the Kemalists 
launched a comprehensive program aimed at the replacement of Islam as the basis of Turkish 
identity with a so-called scientific theory of Turkish peoplehood. This theory was exalted in the 
(in)famous “Turkish History Thesis,” developed in the 1930s by several leading Turkish scientists. 
This thesis, backed up with Darwinian social science and anthropological research, argued that the 
Turks stood at the cradle of all human civilizations.54 The Turkish History Thesis also involved a 
denial of the ethnic identity of the Kurds. The Kurds were constructed as Turks who had “forgotten 
their Turkishness.” This perception, understood as scientific fact, became part of the Turkish state’s 
official discourse, legitimizing a program of forced Turkification that was to “integrate the Kurds 
into the Turkish core.”55 
Above all, these were programs aimed at creating a legible, standardized and manageable 
population. Cultural diversity now became a symptom of backwardness.  In Soviet Central Asia, 
where peoples’ identities were still based on their tribal or clan identities, the response was to 
nationalize the territories they inhabited, most notably through the formation of a standardized 
language. This process would establish the amalgamation of several tribes and clans into a new 
nation. Hence, in the Turkmen republic, the population had to be Turkmenized, in Uzbekistan, 
Uzbekified, etc. This search for identity was for a large part instigated from above, by Soviet 
scientists and anthropologists who marked certain social patterns as being characteristic of the 
newly established nation.56 Yet, this policy created a whole array of contradictory and unwanted 
responses, such as the possibility for certain ethnic groups to wrap resistance to certain policies of 
the Soviet regime in the flag of newly acquired national interests.57 
The practice of population resettlements was part and parcel to the establishment of national 
institutions and the organization of the state according to ethnic criteria. Throughout the 1920s and 
the 1930s, both regimes were actively involved in replacing entire categories of the population, 
although the way they did so and with which purposes differed significantly. In Turkey, two major 
Resettlement Laws were passed in 1926 and in 1934. These laws provided the legal framework for 
settling of Turkish immigrants into non-Turkish areas and, reversely, for the moving of segments of 
the Kurdish populations out of these areas and settling them into western Anatolia where they were 
50 Ibid, 34.
51 For a historiographic discussion, see Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin, eds., State of Nations: Empire and 
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56 Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge & the Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca: Cornell 
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to be “made into Turks.”58 The Kurds that were deported to Western Anatolia were to be spread 
geographically to prevent their congregation in separate territories. This strategy, called ethnic 
dilution by scholars of population policy,59 was already practiced by the CUP during deportations 
of Kurds in the aftermath of the Armenian genocide, testifying to the degree to which strategies of 
population resettlement were a defining aspect of both the Young Turks and the Kemalists.60
In the Soviet Union, the strategy of preaching socialism through newly established national 
institutions also entailed the settling of territorially dispersed population groups into designated 
national territories. Thus, for example, Assyrians, Kalmyks, Jews, Roma, and Gypsies were 
brought together in order to form a national territory so that they could be properly treated as 
nationalities.61 This constructive element in the Soviet strategy of population settlement decreased 
in the increasingly tense international context of the 1930s, and as a response to experiences with 
widespread resistance against the collectivization campaigns in the borderlands.62 This gave way 
to a more primordial understanding of nationality in which certain ethnic or national groups were 
seen as being anti-Soviet or kulak by nature.63 
This increasing exclusiveness on ethnic grounds did not necessary entail an abandonment of 
the nurturist principle, but rather a strengthening of it. It were, most of all, the ethnic and other 
pre-national identities that had to disappear, more so than the specific groups themselves. In the 
perception of the political elite, the ethnic identity of certain groups and resistance to the new 
order in several instances overlapped. This is even more ironic because, to a large extent, it was the 
regime itself which had ascribed ethnic identity through the launching of efforts to categorize the 
population. Importantly, in the Soviet Union ethnic identity was not the only kind of identity that 
could overlap with resistance to the new order, and a whole range of people of Russian ethnicity 
were deemed anti-Soviet by nature and fell subject to repression.
Collective Punishment: The Deportation, Resettlement and Massacring of the Chechen-Ingush 
and the Zaza Kurds 
How were violent population policies planned and implemented, and how did they play out on the 
ground? Here, two instances of mass resettlement programs that were implemented in the Soviet 
Union and in Turkey will be compared in some detail: the resettlement of the entire Chechen-Ingush 
population to Central Asia, and the massacres and mass deportations of the Kurdish population 
in the Dersim area between September 1937 and August 1938. Two important differences between 
these campaigns should be marked from the outset. First, the Soviet deportation of the Chechen-
Ingush occurred during wartime, whereas the Kemalist massacres and deportations of the 
Zaza Kurds occurred during peacetime. Second, the Chechen-Ingush was only one of the many 
nationalities that fell subject to the repressive policies of the state.64 There were also important 
similarities, however. Both campaigns consisted of large-scale operations that were implemented 
by the state with a tremendous display of military or police power, occurring within a relatively 
limited timespan in a well-defined geographic area. Both instances might be dubbed forced 
internal population movements, as they were aimed at the removal and resettlement of a specific 
population group within the boundaries of the state (other than ethnic cleansing, which is typically 
aimed at expelling the population group from the state’s boundaries). Finally, both the Dersim 
Kurds and the Chechen-Ingush had a notable pre-history of clashes with the centralizing state. In 
58 Erol Ülker, “Assimilation, Security and Geographical Nationalization in Interwar Turkey: The Settlement Law of 
1934,” European Journal of Turkish Studies, Social Sciences on Contemporary Turkey, no. 7 (2008), 1-19; Cagaptay, 
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61 Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca: Cornell 
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62 Ibid, 69, 302-8.
63 Weiner, Nature, Nurture, and Memory, 1128-1129.
64 For an overview, see Pavel Polian, Against Their Will: The History and Geography of Forced Migrations in the USSR 
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Heijs
©2018     Genocide Studies and Prevention 12, no. 1  https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.12.1.1579
72
both cases, entire population groups fell subject to collective punishment campaigns because they 
bore the same ethnicity of those who had dared to actively resist the new political order.
 The Chechen and Ingush (referring to themselves as Vainakhs, or “our people”) were 
(and remain) the largest Muslim group in the North Caucasus region. The region they inhabit 
consists of steppe flatlands in the north, and an isolated and mountainous south. The Chechen-
Ingushetia ASSR was considered a backward region by the Soviets. This had much to do with the 
frustrations resulting from attempts to incorporate the region in the Soviet body politic. There 
was widespread resistance in the region to the Bolshevik Red Army during the Civil War, and 
armed peasant resistance to collectivization. During the 1930s, the regime suspected widespread 
activities of counterrevolutionary bands and with the outbreak of the Second World War the region 
saw a serious armed uprising. There were also clashes between the Soviet secret police (People’s 
Commissariat for Internal Affairs; Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del or NKVD) and armed 
gangs, mostly of Chechen-Ingush nationality.65 The Dersim region (current-day Tunceli) is a region 
in Eastern Anatolia that is surrounded by high mountains and has a harsh climate. The region 
was known by the Kemalist regime for its backwardness, lawlessness, and tribalism. The region 
was inhabited by Zaza Kurds that were organized in tribes and spoke a unique form of the Zaza 
language and adhered to a specific branch of Alevism. In 1920, some tribes living in the region 
had demanded autonomy from the newly established Turkish government.66 By the early 1930s, 
the government had still not managed to establish control over the region. Moreover, by that time, 
the Turkish minister of Interior, Şükrü Kaya had been led to believe by several reports that the 
region was prone to resistance, well-armed, and, worst of all, Kurdifying instead of Turkifying.67 
Moreover, under the leadership of Seyit Riza, several tribes had declared their intention to resist 
ongoing government intervention in Dersim. If one is to believe the military reports, 22,700 people 
were involved in this rebellion, of who about 4,200 were armed.68 
Substantial planning preceded both cases of forced population settlement. The Second 
World War and the alleged collaboration of the population with the invading Nazis (even 
though the Chechen-Ingush ASSR avoided full-scale occupation) provided the direct context 
of the resettlement of the Chechen-Ingush. NKVD chief Lavrentiy Beria was responsible for the 
planning and organization of the operation. Preparations to resettle the entire Chechen-Ingush 
population started in December 1943 directly after the Red Army had driven out the German 
Wehrmacht from the Northern Caucasus. Planning under the leadership of Beria had lasted for 
about a year, whereas the operation itself was completed in only a week. Everything was thought 
out in advance. The sudden appearance of a high number of troops was explained as training 
maneuvers of the Red Army in mountainous regions. Those anti-Soviet elements that were 
most likely to actively resist were identified and arrested individually before the onset of the 
operations. Detailed intelligence on the area moreover convinced the NKVD to sweep the more 
easily accessible foothills and lowlands in the first three days, and then use the remaining five 
days to remove the people from the more difficultly accessible mountainous areas.69 To ensure 
effectiveness, the NKVD recruited local party leaders, clerical leaders, and other local elites to 
cooperate. These local authorities were sent into all the districts to announce to the population that 
they would be deported for having betrayed the Motherland and collaborated with the Germans. 
These elites were promised certain benefits during their resettlement (most notably, they were 
permitted to bring more personal belongings upon deportation) and were shipped off on the last 
65 Pohl, Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR, 82-83. 
66 David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 185-186.
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Častʹ 3. Etničeskie Deportacii Periodia Velikoj Otečestvennoj Vojny (22 ijunja 1941- 9 maja 1945), ed.  N.L. Pobol and 
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day of the deportations.70 The Soviet deportation of the Chechen-Ingush was total in intent as well 
as implementation. Even Chechen-Ingush residing outside the area of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR 
fell subject to deportation and resettlement. By February 29, 1944 a mere seven days after the start 
of the operation, Beria reported that 478,479 people were evicted, of whom 91,250 were Ingush and 
387,229 were Chechens.71 
In the case of Dersim, it is more difficult to point at a concrete plan, and operations lasted 
much longer. Central authorities had certainly wanted to suppress and cleanse the region in 
the context of their general intention to abolish both Kurdish territories and Kurdish identity as 
such since the late 1920s, with the formulation of the Eastern Regions Reform Plan. Placing the 
operations in the general context of the widely used practice of resettling Kurds, it is impossible to 
deny that a substantial degree of planning must have been involved, although it remains unclear 
how hasty the decision to actually start the operations was finally made. Operations themselves 
consisted of two phases. Military intervention was triggered in March 1937, with the burning down 
of a strategic bridge. By the spring of 1937, troops started to move in the area, arrested Riza and 
other activists, and hanged them several days after their capture. In the second phase starting in 
1938, a more comprehensive operation was launched. The operation was phrased as a punishment 
campaign that was necessary to civilize and re-educate the local population.72
Both operations were extensively professionalized and involved only very limited mobilization 
of the local population. Beria came to the Chechen-Ingush ASSR with an overwhelming 119,000 
NKVD, NKGD, and SMERSH officers, soldiers, and operatives.73 In Dersim, about 50,000 troops 
were responsible for the operations.74 Relative to the population of the regions, the mobilization of 
armed forces was even larger in Turkey than in the Soviet Union. Yet, the massacres, deportation, 
and resettlement of the Zaza Kurds of Dersim was partial, unlike the total deportation of the 
Chechen-Ingush. The exact number of deaths and deportees in Dersim has not been established 
clearly. A recently found military source counts 13,160 civilian casualties and 11,818 deported out 
of a total population of about 65,000 to 70,000.75
Both operations went accompanied with horrendous brutalities. The deportation of the Zaza 
Kurds from the Dersim area saw a far greater degree of mass murder in relative and absolute 
terms. During the cleansing of a forbidden zone – the core region of Dersim that was most difficult 
to access – the army entered the villages, marched off the local population, and left after burning 
down their houses and fields. A substantial part of the population was killed outright. Villagers 
were assembled in a central square, where they were told they would be deported, and then 
marched off. When outside the forbidden zone, they were tied to their hands, told to stand in a line, 
and shot by machine gun fire. Their bodies were burned. The part of the population that survived 
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the cleansing of the forbidden zone was expelled and settled in more easily accessible (and as a 
result, more easily to control) areas of Dersim.76
Although the NKVD operations in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR were more professionalized and 
saw less high degrees of killing, excesses and atrocities occurred here as well. Of course, these were 
excesses only in the sense of a deviation from an already violent standard. The usual procedure 
was that people were forced into military trucks (US Studebakers provided by the Lend-Lease 
program77) at gunpoint, driven to train stations, and huddled into overcrowded train carriages like 
cattle. In several villages in the mountains that were difficult to access by truck, the entire civilian 
population was massacred. In the village of Khaybakh, an armed NKVD unit that was delayed in 
the mountains locked hundreds of villagers into a local barn, set it on fire, and shot those trying to 
escape.78 The deportees also suffered extreme hardship during their journey to Central Asia. There 
were many instances of typhoid during the transportation, and people that strayed more than the 
permitted distance from the trains, when they stopped for a break, were shot outright.79   
As regards the settlement of the Zaza Kurds and the Chechen-Ingush, both state programs 
were accompanied with practices of ethnic dilution and forced assimilation, two key aspects of 
demographic engineering. Ethnic dilution can be defined as the territorial dispersion of populations 
in order to prevent them from organizing amongst themselves.80 Territorial dispersion of Kurdish 
groups was a core element of Kemalist deportations of Kurds. Exiled Kurdish tribes were sent to 
Western Anatolia with their family, and official government policy stipulated that they were never 
to exceed ten per cent of the local population there.81 The Chechen-Ingush were sent to internal 
exile in so-called special settlements (spetsposelenia). These were villages located in resource-rich 
but inhospitable areas in Central Asia that were built in the 1930s by exiled peasants. Deportees 
were territorially dispersed. The Kazakhstan oblast’ of Akmola, for example, received about 60,000 
deportees, but their number in local communities never exceeded more than a few dozen families. 
This territorial dispersion of deportees prevented them from effective communication and internal 
organization.82 In the special settlements, the Chechens were officially forbidden to express their 
culture. Chechen art, folklore, music, and history were suppressed, and important Chechen 
national figures were purged from the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia.83 In theory, the special settlements 
were seen to function as a mechanism for the re-education of anti-Soviet elements. This practice, it 
seems, remained superficial in practice.84 A policy of linguistic Russification of these peoples was 
pursued, but hardly successfully so. In 1926, 99,7% of Chechen-Ingush spoke their native language, 
and by 1959 the number had dropped a mere one percent to 98,7%.85 
Forced assimilation can be defined as the pursuit of compulsive policies aimed at an 
ethnically defined group of people, which leads to the involuntary adoption of the dominant 
identity or ethnicity of the state.86 With regard to this practice, it can be argued that the very 
act of removal and resettlement was, at least partly, an attempt to achieve assimilation. It 
can also be argued that frustrations with earlier failed attempts of forced assimilation and 
76 Boztas, Did a Genocide Take Place? 
77 Pohl, Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR, 9, 84.
78 Amir Weiner, “Saving Private Ivan: From What, Why, and How?” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian 
History 1, no. 2 (2008), 332; Polian, Against Their Will, 147; Naimark, Fires of Hatred, 97.
79 Pohl, Stalin’s Genocide against the ‘Repressed Peoples’, 284.
80 Morland, Demographic Engineering, 34; Bookman, The Demographic Struggle for Power, 121-146.
81 Zeydanlıoğlu, The White Turkish Man’s Burden, 10.
82 Michaela Pohl, “‘It Cannot Be That Our Graves Will Be Here’: The Survival of Chechen and Ingush Deportees in 
Kazakhstan, 1944-1957,” Journal of Genocide Research 4, no. 3 (2002), 403-404.
83 Francine Hirsch, “Race without the Practice of Racial Politics,” Slavic Review 61, no. 1 (2002), 40.
84 See Lynne Viola, “Stalin’s Empire: The Gulag and Police Colonization in the Soviet Union in the 1930s,” in Stalin 
and Europe: Imitation and Domination, 1928-1953, ed. Timothy Snyder and Ray Brandon (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 18-44, for a concise discussion of the Gulag and special settlement system.
85 Gerhard Simon, Nationalism and Policy toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union: From Totalitarian Dictatorship to 
Post-Stalinist Society (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 395-396. 
86 Bookman, The Demographic Struggle for Power, 105.
The Gardening States
©2018     Genocide Studies and Prevention 12, no. 1  https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.12.1.1579
75
incorporation played an important role in the motivation for both operations. In this regard, it 
is important to distinguish between the direct trigger for deportation – perceived collaboration 
in the case of the Chechen-Ingush, and rebellion in the case of the Zaza Kurds – and deeper 
underlying processes of attempted incorporation of these groups that played an indirect albeit 
fundamental role.
Concerning the settlement of these peoples, the Chechen-Ingush and Zaza Kurds were settled 
in areas where they could more easily be monitored and controlled by the state. In Dersim, this 
happened within the region itself as well, where people were removed from a difficult to access 
forbidden zone and settled in the less isolated periphery of the region.
Discussion
The high degree of practical similarities in the two case studies presented above raises important 
questions about the causal mechanisms underlying the application of forced internal population 
movements as a method of statecraft. Scholars of demographic engineering often understand 
forced (internal) population settlements as being driven by schemes aimed at the enhancement of 
the demographic dominance of a certain ethnic group in a particular geographic area through the 
removal of minority groups.87 Yet, the forced settlement of the Chechen-Ingush and the Zaza Kurds 
does not seem to have been driven by desires of unmixing populations, but rather by a desire to 
establish control over the unruly population groups themselves through settling them in more 
easily controllable areas. It was no coincidence that both Dersim and Chechen-Ingushetia were 
inhospitable and isolated rural regions. In the perverted logic of these regimes, forced population 
settlement was a viable political strategy to incorporate these areas in the political order, as well as 
the people inhabiting them. This observation suggests that not only ethnic identity, but geography 
as well can be an important factor in demographic engineering. 
Of further importance is that both instances of mass violence were framed and legitimized 
as collective punishment operations against peoples resisting the newly installed political order 
and unwilling to give up their so-called backward identity. Despite the extensive use of violence 
and ample instances of cruelty, these were operations of resettlement as much as of removal. The 
Soviets and Kemalists both possessed the operational capacity to murder the entirety of these 
population groups, but they did not do so. It was the cultural identity of these groups that had to 
be eradicated from the face of the earth, not the people as physical beings. This can be accounted 
for by the absence of a motivation of biological racism and by the primacy of nurturist thought. 
These observations could serve to open up the discussion about how these two cases relate to cases 
of (cultural) genocide, and to what extent these cases themselves should be considered as such.88 
Such a discussion, not within the scope of this article, could focus on the way ethnic diversity 
is portrayed in relation to the political goals of the regime in order to understand alternating 
tendencies of incorporation and assimilation as well as their relation to practices of demographic 
engineering, population resettlement and, potentially, to genocide.
Future research could benefit from the framework and analytic insights provided by this 
article and help to provide a more detailed understanding of the similarities and differences of 
these regimes and of their policies. One of the implications of this study has been to underline 
the importance of regime change in order to understand violent population policies towards 
ethnic minorities. Hence, a possibility for further research would be to extend the comparison to 
include other states that experienced regime changes and in which ethnic minority groups made 
up a significant part of the population, such as post-colonial India or Communist China. How did 
these new states represent ethnic diversity? To what extent was resettlement of population groups 
practiced by these states, and with which goals? Were notions of backwardness used to refer to the 
predicament of the country as a whole, or to particular regions of it, in these cases as well? And 
how did this relate to the treatment of ethnic minority groups? Additionally, research with primary 
87 Ibid, 121; Morland, Demographic Engineering, 39; Myron Weiner and Michael Teitelbaum, Political Demography, 
Demographic Engineering (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001), 55, 65-74.
88 See Boztas, Did a Genocide Take Place?; Norman M. Naimark, Stalin’s Genocides (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2010) for separate discussions of these two cases as genocide.
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source material in Turkish and Russian could offer a more comprehensive and varied picture 
of understandings of nationality in both states, as well as of internal discussions on nurturism. 
Primary source material could further give enhanced insight into the fate of the Chechen-Ingush 
and the Zaza Kurds in internal exile. Finally, it would be an important contribution to analyze the 
way the memory of state violence from the perspective of the persecuted groups has played a role 
in recent conflicts between the Russian and Turkish states and Chechen and Kurdish minorities. 
Such research could yield insight into how policies aimed at the forceful incorporation of these 
ethnic groups have had the long-term effect of creating new enmities that continue leading to 
conflict to this very day. 
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